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It is important to note that the court approached the present
problem by the use of traditional choice of law rules. By holding
the foreign substantive law to govern the contract, the action fail-
ed because there was no breach of obligation under the foreign law.
We should not place too much weight on the reference to the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, since it is well recognized that courts
generally refrain from invoking the public policy exception unless
the case has relatively important "contacts" with the forum.
Although the reference to the Fund appears justified in order to
show no repugnancy to our public policy, the mere mention of the
Fund for this purpose does not warrant its use as a stepping stone
for the argument that the Fund Agreement should be the sole
basis of decision.45 Such a rationale would lead to results con-
sistent with those reached through the use of the traditional ap-
proach where, as in the present case, the foreign substantive law
was indicated as the law of the contract. However, as the "con-
tacts" of a case lean substantially more toward the forum," the
Fund approach would still render the contract unenforceable;
whereas the use of ordinary conflict rules would apply the law
of the forum, which would enforce it. 7 Until there is a clear
indication that currency restrictions of fellow Fund members are
to be enforced in all cases, we should not be forced to forsake our
ordinary choice of law rules.
V. CONTRACTS
Arbitration
Today a greater percentage of commercial contracts are pro-
viding for the settlement of disputed terms through arbitration.
44. "Only an actual, strong and adverse interest of the forum will prompt the
court to refuse the application of the foreign law that would govern under general con-flict of laws rules." Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict ofLaws, 49 YALE L. J. 1027, 1031 (1940). "[lit cannot be against the public policy of
this State to hold nationals to the contracts which they have made in their own country
to be performed there according to the laws of that country." Dougherty v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc., supra note 43 at 90, 193 N. E. at 903.
45. It has been suggested that even more consistency of result would occur if
the court had not used traditional choice of law rules of the forum, but rather had
used the International Monetary Fund Agreement as a "superimposed" rule of decision.See note 38, supra; Meyer, Recognilion of LErchange Controls After the InternationalMonetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L. J. 867 (1953) ; 2 At. J. CowP. L. 389 (1953).This would call for an interpretation of several terms in Art. VIII, § 2 (b), especially
"exchange contracts", before the section could be used as the basis of decision. However,
there has been material written to indicate that the instant case could have been decided
under this section. See Meyer, supra. But see Nussbaum, Exchange Control and thc
International Monetary Fund, 59 Ym.E L. 3. 421 (1950).
46. Especially where the place of performance is also the forum.
47. 8ee Central Hanover Bank & T. Co. v. Siemens & Halske G., 15 F. Supp. 927,929 (S. D. N. Y. 1936), aff'd mem., 84 F. 2d 993 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S.585 (1936) ; Glynn v. United Steel Works Corporation, 160 Misc. 405, 289 N. Y. Supp.
1037 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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This method has advantages' over resorting to the courts; it
is less expensive, speedier, avoids unfavorable publicity and the
parties are able to choose their own judge. Parodoxically, the at-
tempt to avoid court proceedings through arbitration clauses has
been thwarted in many instances by disputes over the arbitration
agreement itself. Several different aspects of this problem faced
the Court of Appeals in the 1952 term.
a) Agreements: In New York arbitration is governed gen-
erally by statute.2  The parties may question whether an arbitra-
tion agreement has been made through a proceeding to stay arbi-
tration.3 This was the situation before the court in Level Export
Corp. v. Wolz Aiken & Co.4 A buyer and a seller of textiles nego-
tiated two purchase agreements which were signed by both par-
ties. They incorporated by direct referenceu the provisions of
the Standard Cotton Textiles Sales Note, which calls for arbitra-
tion according to the terms of the Note. The buyer petitioned
under C.P.A. § 1458 (2) for a stay, contending, that since he had
not seen nor read the Standard Sales Note, he was unaware of
the arbitration provision; thus, he had never agreed to arbitra-
tion. The court, observing that the petitioner was a man of wide
experience in the export field and that he was not misled in his
dealings with the seller, held (6-1) that the plain language of the
contract called for arbitration.
The court, taking note that no one is under a duty to arbi-
trate unless by clear language he has so agreed,6 adhered to the
proposition that the determination of whether there is an agree-
ment to arbitrate is based on ordinary contract rules. 7  They ap-
parently felt that this determination did not deserve a closer sur-
veillance than that given to other agreements.8 In compliance
with the established rules, one who signs an instrument in the
1. Phillips, Commercial Arbitration, 44 YALE L. J. 31 (1934).
2. C. P. A. Art. 84, Arbitration.
3. C. P. A. §§1450, 1458 (2).
4. 305 N. Y. 82, 111 N. E. 2d 218 (1953).
5. "This sales note is subject to the provisions of Standard Cotton Textile Sales
note which, by reference, is incorporated as a part of this agreement and together here-
with constitutes the entire contract between buyer and seller."
6. Lehman v. Ostrovsky, 264 N. Y. 130, 190 N. E. 208 (1934).
7. "But although arbitration agreements in this State are now enforceable, that
does not mean that the rules, heretofore applicable to the interpretation of contracts to
determine whether the parties have agreed to arbitration have been abrogated." General
Silk Importing Co. v. Gerseta Corp., 200 App. Div. 786, 798, 194 N. Y. Supp. 15,
19 (1st Dep't 1922) (Which held a provision incorporating rules of "Silk Association
of America" had not indicated a sufficient intent to agree to arbitration. Distinguished
in the instant case).
8. Phillips, Rules of Law in Arbitration, 47 HAav. L. RM,. 590 (1933) ; But see
General Silk Importing Co. '. Gerseta, supra note 7 at 792, 194 N. Y. Supp. 15 at
20 (1st Dep't 1922), "But on the other hand since the contract to arbitrate presupposes
an agreement to forego the right to resort to the courts for redress an alleged contract
to arbitrate, which is disputed, will be subject to strict construction in order that the
parties may not be deprived of their constitutional right in the courts."
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absence of fraud is conclusively presumed to know and agree to
its contents whether or not he has read them.9
Judge Desmond, in dissent, which -was concurred in by Judge
Fuld, believed that consent to arbitrate was a matter of fact and
not of law. He would not apply the conclusive presumption rule,
applicable to cases where a person signs a contract without hav-
ing read the contents, to arbitration cases. 10
The idea that a closer scrutiny should be given to alleged
agreements to arbitrate, because such agreements prevent the
parties from seeking relief in the courts, is not deserving any
longer. The parties to commercial contracts are aware that arbi-
tration agreements are a commonly used method to settle contro-
versies. The proceeding is quite comparable to court proceedings
along the lines of fair standards and decisions.
A recent holding of the Appellate Division in Riverdale Fab-
rics Corp. v. Tillinghast-Stiles Co., 1 emphasises the effect of the
decision in the instant case.
b) Arbitrator: Once axbitration has been settled upon as
the method to determine controversies, the parties must then
choose, or make provisions for selection of, an arbitrator. 2 Gen-
erally, any person, persons, or body may be agreed upon by the
parties.'3  The quasi-judicial nature of the arbitrator's position
would appear to require that he have no interest in the outcome
other than to render a fair and justifiable decision on the merits. 14
An award rendered on the basis of prejudice or bias is subject to
9. Metzger v. Aetna Ins. Co., 227 N. Y. 411, 416, 125 N. E. 814, 816 (1920) ;
Matter of Levy, 271 App. Div. 431, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 860 (1st Dep't 1946), af'd, 296 N. Y.
837, 72 N. E. 2d 25 (1947) ; 1 COmIN, CONTRACTs § 107 (1951).
10. Compare the RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 70 (1932), on an assumption clause in
a deed. "Although a grantee who signs a deed is bound by all the clauses and must fulfill
his undertaking as stated in the deed a mortgage assumption clause in a deed must be
explicitly shown to be assented to because it is not normally a part of the deed."
11. In 281 App. Div. 983, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 261 (2d Dep't April 1953) (Contract
subject to "Cotton Yarn Rules" containing arbitration provision). The court on re-
argument reversed by a 3-2 decision an order they had made in Rizverdale Fabrics Corp.
v. Tillinghoast-Stiles Co., 281 App. Div. 831, 118 N. Y. S. 2d 569 (2d Dep't Feb. 1953)
which had been granted on the authority of Level Export v. TIt.lz Aiken, 280 App. Div.
211, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 549 (1st Dep't 1952). In reversal the majority specifically relied
on the Court of Appeals decision in the Level Export case.
12. C. P. A. § 1452 provides that the court shall appoint an arbitrator when the
parties fail to provide for one or where their arrangement has not succeeded.
13. "Although the parties may ecercise their right to name the arbitrator in the
clause at the time the contract is made, it is not desirable. Under the Arbitration Rules
it is not encouraged for the following reasons: (1) . . .; (2) . . . ; (3) The status
of the arbitrators may have changed, rendering them incompetent or. by reason of their
changed relation to a party, open them to the suspicion of partiality . . .; (4) . . .
(5) • • • ;" CODE OF ARBrIRATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 50-51 (1931).
14. American Eagle F. Ins. Co. v. Vew Jersey Ins. Co., 240 N. Y. 398, 148 N. E.
562 (1925) ;
Matter of Friedman, 215 App. Div. 130, 135, 213 N. Y. Supp. 369, 374 (1st Dep't
1926).
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being set aside.,5 But, to set aside an award on the basis of par-
tiality requires a clear and well-founded showing that it was there-
by influenced.'8
However necessary impartiality is to the arbitrator's decision
it is merely a desirable asset and not required of one selected to
serve as arbitrator. If the arbitrator is found to have some in-
terest or relationship that raises doubt as to his ability to render
an impartial decision,.it is incumbent upon the objecting party to
voice his- disapproval. If he allows the dispute to proceed to, or
continue in, arbitration, without objection, then he is deemed to
have waived his complaint.sr Also, where the arbitrator has been
agreed upon at the execution of the contract and his interest is
known or should have been known, neither party can be heard to
complain later."'
The fact, that one of the parties to an agreement was a cor-
poration owned beneficially by the Soviet Government and the
arbitrator agreed upon was the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, was enough to establish
that the complainant should have had knowledge of a possibly un-
favorable interest of the arbitrator. In Amtorg Trading Corp. v.
Camden Fibre Mills" the Court of Appeals maintained that since
the parties contracted for this arbitrator, "Camdei . . . may
not now ask the courts to relieve it of its contractual obligation it
assumed." The dispute must proceed to arbitration before the
arbitrator selected. However, the court pointed out that if he
rendered an evidently partial decision it could be vacated by proper
proceedings.
' Apparently, the rationale for the waiver rule and the court's
decision is threefold: (1) No fraud is committed at the outset if
the parties are aware or should be aware of the arbitrator's in-
terest. (2) Mferely because an arbitrator has some relationship
with one of the parties, his decision will not necessarily be biased.
The parties may have chosen the arbitrator for his capabilities and
familiarity with the problem involved"' despite his ostensible dis-
15. "[T]he court must make an order vacating the award,. . . (2) 'Where, there
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or either of them." C. P. A. § 1462.
16. Davy v. Faw, 7 Cranch. 171 (U. S. 1810) ; Brush v. Fisher, 20 Mich. 469, 38
N. W. 446 (1888).
17. Matter of Newberger v. Rose, 228 App. Div. 526, 528, 240 N. Y. Supp. 436, 438,
439 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd uithout opinion, 254 N. Y. 546, 173 N. E. 659 (1930) ; 6 Wn.-
LISTON, CONTRAcrs § 1929 A (Rev. ed. 1938).
18. Matter of Avalon Fabrics, 195 Misc. 267, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 166 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
r*thout opinion, 275 App. Div. 1032, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 310 (1st Dep't 1949) ; 6 VniSoN,
Co,m'crs § 1923A (Rev. ed. 1938).
19. 304 N. Y. 519, 109 N. E. 2d 606 (1953).
20. "[M]ost arbitrators are reasonably familiar with the practices of the in-
dustry in which they arbitrate . . . Many have wide experience in arbitrating, fre-
quently have handled previous cases for the parties and may be highly skilled specialists
in the field!" Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 2 Bmo. L. Rr. I at 23.
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qualification. (3) There is always available a remedy in case of
a basically unfair and unjustifiable determination.
c) Effect on legal action: Having agreed to arbitrate all
disputes, the parties are required to abide by this provision be-
fore they may pursue legal action,21 unless, of course, they waive
their rights by consent or conduct.' Coincidentally, the parties
may provide that waiver will be effected if a designated period of
time is allowed to lapse before a demand for arbitration is made. 23
It is an obvious proposition that waiver by one party cannot affect
the rights of the other. Furthermore, it would be a misapplication
of the waiver principal to invoke it when a party was merely
seeking to enforce the agreement.24 This is essentially the rationale
used by Judge Conway in River Rice Mills v. Labtrobe Brew. Co. 25
A dispute arose between seller (petitioner) and buyer on a con-
tract which provided that all claims or controversies were to be
settled by arbitration. The contract contained a further clause
stating that a demand for arbitration must be made within five
days after tender. No demand was made until a year later, at
which time the seller obtained an injunction to stay arbitration.
Two months subsequent the buyer brought an action on the con-
tract in City Court; before answer, the seller petitioned, under
C.P.A. § 1451, for a stay of the proceedings until arbitration could
be had. The lower court refused the stay }.ut the Appellate Divi-
sion"I reversed (3-2) and this court unanimously affirmed the re-
versal. Judge Conway, speaking for the court, made it clear that
if they were to permit the law action, the effect would be to make
the arbitration agreement revocable at the will of one of the par-
ties. Either party could merely allow the time limit to expire and
then seek damages in a court of law on the theory that arbitration
was no longer available (as here argued by the buyer). To suc-
cumb to this argument, Judge Conway decided, would undermine
the policy behind the Arbitration Laws.2 7
Judge Conway also considered whether C.P.A. § 1451 was to
apply to a situation where a party pursued his legal remedy after
21. C. P. A. § 1451 provides that if there is in existence an arbitration agreement
and the issue which is raised between the parties is "referrable to arbitration," then anylaw suit must be staved "until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the contract"
22. Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N. Y. 15, 139 N. E. 764 (1923).23. C. P. A. § 10 (1) ; See Matter of Broodway-40th Street Corp., 271 App. Div.219, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (1st Dep't 1946), af'd, 296 N. Y. 165, 71 N. E. 2d 451 (1947).
24. See generally 3 CoaRBN, COXTRACTS § 753.
25. 305 N. Y. 36, 110 N. E. 2d 545 (1953); see 8 Aim. J. N. S. 40.26. River Brand Rice Mills v. Latrobe Brezw. Co., 280 App. Div. 247, 113 N. Y. S.
2d 132 (1952).
27. See American, Reaerve Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 297 N. Y. 322, 79 N. E. 2d425 (1948) ; Matter of Fever Transp. Local No. 445, 295 N. Y. 87, 91, 65 N. F. 2d 178,
180 (1946).
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demanding arbitration although arbitration had been precluded
by the lapse of a time limit. C.P.A. § 1451 contemplates that a
party to an arbitration agreement tries to avoid arbitration by
first suing at law; upon application by the opposing party the
statute makes a stay of such suit mandatory 28 and thereby compels
the claimant to resort to arbitration. He determined, that although
the latter was the customary procedure, the former was within
the meaning of the "whole spirit and purpose" of C.P.A. Art. 84,
Arbitration. Its intendment is to enforce arbitration where the
parties have so agreed and to make this their exclusive remedy2
The decision leaves no doubt that a valid self imposed statute
of limitations effecting arbitration agreements will apply equally
to the ability to sue at law on a dispute referable to arbitration.
d) "Penzalty" Provisions: Usually a court will not review
an arbitrator's award unless it is based on fraud or the issue de-
cided is beyond that submitted.0 Where, however, the contract
involved is illegal or contains illegal provisions, or offends public
policy, review is warranted and the award may be set aside.3'
The relative bargaining power of the parties to a contract is
determinate of the concessions that may be won. The law, based
on a distaste for coercion, superimposes limits and consequently
will not enforce a penalty provision s" which does not bear a rea-
sonable relation to actual compensatory damages. 33
* The problem then presented is whether a contract provision,
empowering an arbitrator to set a "penalty", will be reviewed
and set aside. In 1952 the Appellate Division 4 upheld a contract
provision "authorizing a penalty, as determined by arbitration,
of not less than 2% and not more than 10% of the market value.
28. See note 21 supra.
29. American Reserve Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., supra note 27.
30. C. P. A. § 1462; Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. V.
284, 298, 169 N. E. 386, 391 (1929).
31. Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Assn., 299 N. Y. 177,
86 N. E. 2d 162 (1949) ; Matter of Metro lan v. Miscione, 257 App. Div. 652, 15 N. Y.
S. 2d 35 (1st Dep't 1939) ; Matter of Gate v. Hilts, 176 Misc. 277, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 18
(Sup. Ct. 1941) (usurious contracts).
32. See generally, 5 CoRkxL, CoNTAcTs § 1057; McCormick, Liq'idated Damages,
17 VA. L. REv. 103 (1930); REsTATE.MENT, CONTRAcTs § 339, comment a.
33. See 5 CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 1077; Demogue, Validity of the Theory of Con-
tensatory Damages, 27 YALE L. J. 585 (1918).
34. Eas India Trading Co. v. Halari, 280 App. Div. 420, 214 N. Y. S. 2d 93 (1st
Dep't 1952), 62 Cob- L. Rsv. 943, 28 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 217 (1953), 27 ST. JoiNt's L.
REv. 346 (1953). But cf. Publisher's Ass'n v. Newspaper's Union, 280 App. Div. 500,
144 N. Y. S. 2d 401 (1st Dep't 1952); 2 BF.o. L. REv. 157; 52 COL. L. REV. 943; 28
N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 217 (1953); 27 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 346 (1953) (vacating an arbi-
trator's award of a conditional $5,000 penalty for a union violation of a no-strike provi.
sion of a collective contract).
35. Incorporated in the rules of the American Spice Trade Association.
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The Court of Appeals in East India Trading Co. v. Halari8 affirm-
ed, without opinion, by a scant 4-3 majority.
The dissenters, led by Judge Van Voorhees, would not accept
the reasoning of the majority in the Appellate Division as applied
to this case. The lower court had stated, that since judicial notice
can be taken of expenses of litigation and the inadequacy of or-
dinary costs, 87 the "penalty" here was in the nature of liquidated
damages. 8
Judge Van Voorhees reasoned that the percentage limits were
not related by the terms of the contract to extra damages or litiga-
tion expenses because the percentage was to be computed on the
market value at the time of the default, not upon the appreciated
market value above the contract price. The arbitrator was not
given discretion as to whether a "penalty" should or should not
be awarded. Thus, the "penalty" was to be awarded regardless
of whether the market price had risen or decreased at the time of
default. This would permit the purchaser to refuse to accept the
goods and still receive two percent in the event of a falling market.
Nor, did the contract provide a reasonable standard to guide the
arbitrator in making an award for compensatory damages caused
by special circumstances..
Several reasons have been advanced which serve as a basis
for the majority's affirmance: (1) The danger of an unfair bar-
gain is obviated by the court's review power over arbitration
awards. 9  (2) The policy favoring non-interference with the ar-
bitration process overrides the penal aspect of the provision. (3)
The hands-off attitude of the law, which allows a wide range of
bargaining, makes it difficult to distinguish between a penalty and
liquidated damages.
40
However, the dissenters feel that the assumption that arbi-
trators are reasonable men is not necessarily valid. They contend
further that the courts are forbidden in most instances to go be-
hind the arbitrator's award to search the evidence with the purpose
of determining what actuated the decision.41 Lastly, since the
courts themselves are disinclined to 'enforce punitive clauses
formulated by individuals, the arbitrator who lacks punitive au-
thority should not be so empowered.
36. 305 N. Y. 866, 114 N. E. 2d 213 (1953).
37. PErs. Paop. LAW § 148; 5 Co m. CONTRACTS § 1054.
38. East India Trading Co. v. Halari, supra at 421, 114 N. Y. S. 2d at 94; see
WMusToN, CONTRAcrs § 778 (3d rev. ed. 1936).
39. 52 Co- L. REv. 943, 944, 945 (1952).
40. 28 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 217, 218 (1953).
41. 2 Bro. L. REv. 157 (1952) ; Summefs, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
2 BFLo. L. REv. 1 (1952) ; Matter of Motor Haulage and International Brotherhood of
Tean sUrs, 272 App. Div. 382, 383, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 352, 353 (1st Dep't 1947).
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Undoubtedly the decision is not precedent value for the pro-position that a similar penalty provision in a contract would be
'upheld in an action at law for damages. Furthermore, the strong
dissent by three members of the Court of Appeals indicates a dis-
favor with any similar provision even if awarded within the frame-
work of arbitration. Had the "penalty" been a fixed sum, or the
percentage range been at a higher bracket, or if the arbitrator had
made his award on the basis of 10% rather than 2% this writer
believes the award would not have been allowed as liquidated
damages.
Impossibility of Performance
In 1647 a general rule was expounded that the parties to a
contract ought not be excused from their self-created duties be-
cause a subsequent event had rendered performance impossible.42
The contract should have provided for such contingencies. This
strict rule has since been hacked away by many exceptions. The
feeling now prevails that at least a portion of the risk of disap-
pointment from supervening unforeseen events should be allocated
to the promisee.4 3 It is recognized that if the law prevents per-
formance on the part of the promissor he should not be penalized
for yielding to its commands.44 This rationale will also apply
to judicial orders and decrees 'instituted by a third party, unless
the proceedings were a result of the defendants own negligence
or breach of duty to others, and if no means of avoiding such
interference with performance are reasonably available.4 5 Under
the latter circumstances the event could not be said to be for-
tuitous.
With this background in mind it is not difficult to follow the
extreme logic of the Court of Appeals when it dissallowed the
defense of impossibility in General Analine Film Corp. v. Bayer
Co.46
The plaintiff brought suit on a contract its assignor's had
executed with the defendant. The U. S. Government instituted
anti-trust proceedings against the defendant and on a consent de-
cree issued an injunction restraining the defendant from perform-
ing any terms of the agreement. The plaintiff had not been made
a party to the anti-trust action. The court spoke in terms of the
effect of a consent decree, its admissability in evidence, and its
validity. They concluded that the plaintiff would be deprived
42. Pardine v. Jane, Aleyn 26 (1647).
43. 6 CoRBm, CONTRACTS § 1320.
44. Id. § 1343.
45. Id. § 1346.
46. 305 N. Y. 479, 113 N. E. 2d 844 (1953).
